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IS A JUDGMENT OPEN TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IF
RENDERED WITHOUT WRITTEN PLEADINGS AS
REQUIRED BY STATUTE, OR IF THE WRIT-
INGS DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS?
T is believed that no good reason can be assigned for answering
the above question, in the affirmative. Certainly none has yet
been discovered in a careful search of the cases involving the
point. And yet the assurance and unanimity with which lawyers
and judges give the affirmative answer to it on first thought is in-
deed remarkable. For instance, Mr. Justice FiZLD in speaking for
the Supreme Court of the United States, on the question as to wheth-
er a judgment is subject to collateral attack if one served with pro-
cess is not permitted to make any defense when he appears in an-
swer to such process, said arguendo: "The decree of a court of
equity upon oral allegations without written pleadings would be an
idle act of no force beyond that of an advisory proceeding of the
chancellor."1 He made the statement as if it were obviously true,
and citation of authority was unnecessary and would -be surplusage.
He certainly cites no authority for his proposition, indeed there is
none to cite; nor does he advance any reason to support his conclu-
sion to that effect. Such judicial utterances as are to be found to
this effect are of very much the same off-hand and ill considered sort.
When the question. came before the same court in a later case in which
it was necessary to decide the question to dispose of the case, the
same justice had no difficulty in, reaching the opposite conclusion. 2
On the other hand, why should a judgment be sustained against a
collateral attack on the failure to file written pleadings or to allege
such matter as the statute requires to be alleged?
i. Because the statute has not in terms declared that the judg-
ment shall be open to such attack for the failure to comply with the,
statutory requirements; and, it is much more probable that the legis-
lative intent was either to prescribe a certain and convenient practice,,
.whereby all might know one safe way to proceed, without in any'
manner trenching on the other proper methods of proceeding there-
tofore in vogue q1 -)ermitted; or else that the legislative intent was
to declare a right to the opposite party to insist on this one method
of proceeding in exclusion, of all other procedure, like the statutes
lWindsor v. McVeigh 0876), 93 U. S. (3 Otto) 274, 283.
*Hall v. Law (88o), 102 U. S. 46!, 463.
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which declare that parties shall be competent witnesses in their own
behalf, or that witnesses who would be infamous by the common law
shall be competent, and evidence of their infamy shall be admissible
merely to discredit their testimony. Who would suppose that a
judgment would be void on collateral attack because the court erred
in excluding such evidence, whereby the defeated party was unable
to prove his case or defense, dierefore the judgment was rendered
against him? A party aggrieved by such a ruling would be supposed
by all to be bound by the judgment if he took no appeal from it or
assigned no error on the ruling. Suppose that a statute should de-
clare that a party should not be liable on an oral promise in certain
cses, and suit is brought on such a promise, in such a manner that
the nature of the case appears on the face of the pleadings, would any-
one suppose that a judgment sustaining the complaint on demurrer
was void and open to collateral attack because the judge erred in
sustaining the complaint? If such were the law, a demurrer would
be an idle thing; as well treat the whole proceeding with contempt.
Else if a demurrer were sustained when it should, not be, the judg-
ment would always e void. Not so; power to decide includes
power to decide the wrong way as well as the right, else it is no
power at all.
2. Because, as already suggested, judgment that plaintiff recover
includes in it an adjudication that his complaint states a cause of
action. If the complaint be oral, judgment for the plaintiff neces-
sarily adjudicates that the complaint is sufficient. It is res adjudicata
on that point till vacated. What has been decided is not open to
dispute.
3. Because allmatterof form is merely for the convenience of the
court and parties in expediting the trial, rendering the matters de-
cided more certain, preserving the memory of them, or the like; and
whatever is required, for convenience may be waived.
4. Because there is nothing about the matter inherently requiring
that the pleadings be written. Originally all proceedings in all courts
were oral. When writing was first introduced it was in the form of
memoranda made by the court and not of written pleadings by the
parties. Written pleadings introduced merely by custom cannot be
jurisdictional. To this day motions may be made in open court or-
ally, and advantage of points taken by written _adings may be
orally waived at the trial in any court; whereby it is the same to all
intents and purposes of record as if the pleadings were oral. In
many inferior courts the pleadings are to this day all oral; and if an
inferior court's decision without written pleadings is valid, certainly
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the greater power and dignity of the superior courts does not render
their similar proceedings void; indeed, when cases from such in-
ferior courts come before a superior court for new trial on appeal,
they are still heard in the superior courts on the same oral pleadings
as were the basis of the hearing in the court below; if they can pro-
ceed. on oral pleadings in some cases, similar proceedings in other
cases can be no more than error. Even in the superior courts, the
defendant's plea in criminal cases is still oral. If writing is not
indispensable when life and liberty are involved judgments in civil
cases should not be held- subject to collateral attack for want of
written pleadings. In the most important of all civil cases, eject-
ment to try title, the written pleadings in no just sense disclose the
nature of the controversy.'
5. Because subjecting judgments to collateral attack for want of
written pleadings is to enable one to take advantage of a defect
after he has waived it by proceeding without the writing when he
might have objected, and would have done so if it had been of any
advantage to him to have done so. To allow the objection now is to
surrender justice for mere form. The public has already sufficiently
lost its respect for the courts by seeing them defeat the purpose of
their creation by betraying justice for form, and making the temple
of justice a house of jugglery, where astuteness and sharp practice
are permitted to defeat admitted rights. This public impression is
not improved by the spectacle of a court solemnly adjudicating a
thing today, and as solemnly declaring the next day that what it
did before amounts to nothing. If courts would be respected by the
public they must respect the proceedings of each. other. If they
would have a reputation for doing justice they must not make jus-
tice subservient to form, at least not to the extent of permitting col-
lateral attacks to succeed when based solely on departures from pres-
cribed form.
When a case was set for trial without filing the written reply to
the supplemental answer, as required by statute, it was held. there
was no error in requiring the parties to proceed to trial over objection
that there were no written pleadings as required by law, because
they had waived the objection.3 If it ever became too late to make
the objection in the original suit itself, all the more, it'could never be
availed of for the purpose of a collateral attack.
In England a man was convicted of perjury in testifying against
one on trial before a magistrate, for a statutory offense of which the
magistrate was given cognizance by a statute by which. the procedure
3 Veysey v. Bernard (i9o8). 49 Wash. 571. 95 Pac. xo96.
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was prescribed to be by sworn information in writing. Appeal was
taken from the conviction of perjury on the ground that the magis-
trate had no jurisdiction in the case in which the alleged false testi-
mony was given, for the reason that there was no information in
writing authorizing him to take cognizance of the case. In the court
for crown cases reserved nine of the judges were of the opinion that
absence of a written information did not go to the jurisdiction.
KELLY, C. B., was of opinion that there was no perjury, because that
crime can be committed only by giving false testimony concerning a
matter material in a case in court : and here was no case in court since
there was no charge in writing against the person on trial, and the
magistrate was not authorized to proceed on any other sort of charge.
In holding the contrary, HAWKINS, J., said: "I am of opinion that
the conviction was right, and ought to be affirmed. In arriving at
this opinion, I have assumed as a fact, from the case as stated, that
Stanley was arrested and brought before the justices upon, as illegal
a warrant as ever was issued. A warrant signed by a magistrate, not
only without any written information or oath to justify it, but without
any information at all.* *Wrongful, however, as were the proceedings
by which Stanley was brought into the presence of the magistrates,
to answer a charge which up to that moment had. never been legally
preferred against him, before these magistrates, and in his presence,
a charge was made, over which if duly made, they had jurisdiction.
Upon that charge it was that the hearing proceeded; and in support of
that charge it was that the defendant was sworn, and in giving his
evidence swore corruptly and falsely. * * * If the contention on the
part of the defendant be correct, then Stanley, even though he had
suffered the whole imprisonment to which he was sentenced, would be
liable to be tried again, and could not plead autrefois convict; and if
he had been acquitted would have been in no condition to plead mtre-
fois acquit. Two very startling consequences. A flood of author-
ities might be cited in support of the proposition that no process at
all is necessary, when, the accused being bodily before the justices,
the charge is made in his presence, and he appears and answers it."
In arguing to the same effect, HUDDLESTON, B., said: "In practice
an information is never produced before the justices. If in writing
it remains with the magistrate granting the summons or warrant, as
the warrant remains in the custody of the constable. The clerk to
the justices, or the police officer present, states the substance of the
information, that is the nature of the charge. Sometimes where there
is a charge sheet, as in the metropolitan district, reading from it,
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otherwise not. The charge sheet is merely the statement drawn up
by the inspector at the station of the charge preferred, before
him. He states in fact the substance of the charge or information,
and the prisoner is called on to plead. He may admit the truth and
plead guilty, or he may not admit the truth and desire to be tried for
it-or he may apply to adjourn or object to the jurisdiction. But if
he make no objection, and here it is found, that Stanley made no ob-
jection, the case must proceed. Principle and authorities seem
to show that objections and defects in the form of procuring the
appearance of a party charged will be cured by appearance. The
principle is, that a party charged should have an opportunity of know-
ing the charge against him, and be fully heard, before being condemn-
ed. * *- * The arrest of Stanley was no doubt illegal, there had been
no information-or oath to justify the warrant, and it might be, that
if the objection had been taken the magistrates might have enter-
tained it; but they could then and there have issued their summons
for Stanley's apprehension at once on a verbal information which
would be good." In speaking to the same point,.DFNMAN, J., said:
"If, as I suppose (and here I am putting the case as favorably as it
can be put for the defendant), nothing more happened than that the
maglstrate inquired: "What is the charge against that man?'
And Hughes said in answer,-'I charge him with assaulting me, and
obstructing me in the execution of my duty.' I apprehend that the
magistrates would at once have had jurisdiction to put Hughes upon
his oath and, inquire into several matters upon any one of which the
perjury might have been committed, wholly without reference to what
they might in the result feel themselves bound to do or not to do."
4
In approving this decision in a later case on the same point, the
same court said: "If one who may insist on it (a written charge)
waives it, submits to the judge and takes his trial, it is afterwards
too late for him to question the jurisdiction, which he might have
questioned at the time."5
In Rhode Island a statute empowered the probate court of the
county to authorize the administrator to sell land in certain cases,
and prescribed that the administrator should file a petition in writing
showing ground for such sale. An order of sale was made by a
probate court on oral application by the administrator, and sale made
accordingly: and the supreme court of the state held that the want
' Queen v .Hughes (x879). 4 Q. B. D. 614, 14 Cox Cr. Cas. 284, 40 L. T. 685, 48
L. J. M. C. igi. 29 Moak 67.
5 Dixon v. Wells (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 249, 255.
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of written petition was not jurisdictional. 6 The same was held by
the supreme court of Florida.7 And the contrary was held in Texas.5
An Indiana statute empowered the circuit court of the county
where any land was situate to make partition thereof on application
of any person interested. Such partition was made, and in a later
case the proceeding was attacked collaterally because no complaint
or petition of the applicant for partition appeared in the records,
and without one the proceeding was void. The Supreme Court of
the United States held- the objection not well taken. saying: "The
statute does not in terms require the application of the proprietor
seeking a partition to be presented in writing, or, if one be presented,
to be filed among the records of the court. All that it designates
as necessary to authorize the court to act is, that there should, be an
application for the partition of one or more joint proprietors, after
giving notice of the intended application in a public newspaper for
at least four weeks. When application is made, the court must con-
sider whether it is by a proper party, whether it is sufficient in form
and substance, and whether the requisite notice has been given as
prescribed. Its order made thereon is an adjudication upon these
matters. The recitals in the order show a compliance with the sta-
tute; they show jurisdiction in the court over the subject. That
jurisdiction arises upon the presentation of the application accompan-
ied with proper proof of previous notice of it. The order of the
court appointing the commissioners is a determination that the ap-
plication is sufficient, and that due notice of it had been given. This
conclusion is not open to collateral attack; it can only be questioned
on appeal or writ of error by a superior tribunal invested with ap-
pellate jurisdiction to review it."9
When it appeared on proceedings to revive against executors a
judgment recovered against deceased that no declaration could be
found, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania treated it as if no declara-
tion had ever existed, and held that if it was error, there having been
no appearance by defendant in response to process, the judgment
was not void, and allowed it to be revived. In North Carolina, on
motion to vacate a judgment because there was no complaint in
writing on which to render it, the court said: "Although regularly it
ought to be in writing and filed at the commencement of the plead-
ings, and although we do not wish to be considered as favoring loose
practice but the contrary, yet evidently by consent the complaint may
'Robbins v. Tefft (1878). 12 11. I. 67.
'merson v. Ross (1879). 17 Fla. 122.
s Finch v. Edmonson (853), 9 Tex. 504.
'Hall v. Law (188o), boz U. S. 461.
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be waived, and, judgment may be confessed or entered by consent.
And even if the judgment for such cause were irregular, it is cer-
tainly not void."10
In sustaining a proceeding to revive a dormant judgment against
demurrer on the ground that the petition on which the judgment was
rendered did not state a cause of action, wherefore the judgment
was void for want of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Missouri
said in a recent case: "It goes without saying that such a judgment
is -binding and conclusive on the parties, and cannot be impeached for
any defect in the pleading or proof; and that in a suit upon it the suf-
ficiency of the petition on which it was rendered or the merits of the
judgment cannot be inquired into.""'
The defendant in ejectment claimed title under an administrator's
deed, setting up and offering the record in such proceeding to prove
his title. It appeared that an administrator petitioned for license to
sell, which license was granted-, but he did not sell, being unable to
find a buyer. Later he resigned, his resignation was accepted, a suc-
cessor appointed, and later the probate court mad'e an order licensing
the successor to sell without any petition for such license having been
filed by him. It was objected, that the order granting the last license
was void, because made without petition therefor, and that the first
license was void, and the sale thereunder void, because the petition
therefor did not allege any statutory ground to authorize the court to
grant such license. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that no
new petition was necessary, the new and old administrators being one
person in law, and that the sufficiency of the petition was immaterial
on collateral attack, saying: "The petition in our view, states suffici-
ent to authorize the court to issue the license; but even if it did not,
and the court would so hold in a direct proceeding to set it aside, yet
*where it has been acted upon as sufficient by the court having ex-
clusive original jurisdiction of the subject-matter, it will be sustained
in the court when collaterally attacked, where there was no collusion
and fraud. The authority to grant a license to sell real estate carries
with it the implied power to determine the necessity for such sale, and
the sufficiency of the pleadings presented to the court for that pur-
pose; and -where it has jurisdiction, its orders and judgments are
valid until set aside. There is nothing, therefore, in this abjection.
** * The original purchase price was used in paying their father's
debts, and the purchaser should be protected. If this was not so, it
"Leach v. Western N. C. Ry. Co. (1871), 6S N. C. 486.
UHolt County v. Cannon (1893). 114 M o. S14, 21 S. W. 8S1. To the same effect;
Koehler v. Holt Mfg. Co. (x9o). 146 Cal. 335. So Pac. 73; Figge v. Rowlen (xgoo),
x8s Ill. 234, 57 N. 1. 195.
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would be impossible for an executor or administrator to sell real
property belonging to the estate of the deceased for the payment of
debts due from the estate, for any sum near its true value. No one
but a speculator in disputed titles would care to invest in property
the title to which might be overturned many years afterwards, and
the effect would be to prevent competition, depress the value of the
property, and, in many cases, deprive the creditors of their just
dues."' 2
JOHN R. ROOD.
UNlVRSITY OF MICHIGAN.
12 Trumble v. Williams (88s), x8 Neb. 144, 24 N. V. 716.
